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Introduction
The conventional view on legitimacy emerges from discussions on po-litical authority and is primarily concerned with coercive relation-ships. Although this perspective has also dealt with non-coercive
organisations, it focuses more on the interplay between organisation sur-
vival and legitimacy than on the cooperative efforts and difficulties of
maintaining legitimacy in inclusive movements comprising multiple or-
ganisations. The moderate view believes that the legitimacy of social
movements derives from pure intentions and positive consequences, rather
than democratic procedures. Based on interviews of leaders of major
groups within the Umbrella Movement (UM), this article argues that the
absence of effective democratic procedures might lead to what we call the
“forced democratisation” of decision-making power: a bottom-up chal-
lenge of the legitimacy of the decision-making group’s interest represen-
tation. This article has two purposes: (1) to argue that even in apparently
voluntary social movements, such as the UM, legitimation is still a signif-
icant concern for participants, and (2) to demonstrate that legitimation
crises can constrain leaders’ choice of strategic options, hence altering the
course of the movement.
We first discuss the significance of legitimacy as a conceptual tool in ex-
plaining social movements. Then, after discussing our research method and
context, we articulate how legitimacy concerns have affected UM leaders’
major decisions and respective legitimating mechanisms. Finally, we discuss
the implications of the findings.
Leadership legitimation
Social movements are voluntary events: participants can quit whenever
they want, and there is no coercive relationship between participants and
leaders. The chief concern for social movement leaders is to mobilize social
movement bases by building a consensus among organisational networks
and potential participants (Tilly and Tarrow 2015). The choice by several
movement organisations to include the word “consent” in their founding
documents and guidelines may create the illusion that the issue of legiti-
macy is settled prior to the beginning of a movement (Earl 2007; Porta
2009). However, as James Q. Wilson (1974) accurately depicts, coordinating
actions in voluntary associations can be challenging: 
In most voluntary associations, authority is uncertain and leadership
is precarious. Because the association is voluntary, its chief officer
has neither the effective power nor the acknowledged right to coerce
the members – they are, after all, members and not employees.
(p. 215)
People do challenge the legitimacy of leaders, and negotiations of interests
among participants are an important component of collective actions.
Sometimes, people feel that leaders have organisational advantages that
they lack; hence, they are reliant on their leaders for claim-makings. Yet,
leaders might be inefficient in communicating with participants about their
concerns, or they might reach unfair or biased decisions (Michels 1962).
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Leadership in large-scale movements is always uncertain and precarious be-
cause dynamics and conflicts among participants are complicated and un-
avoidable (Cheng and Chan 2017). Scholars are not unaware of the issue of
legitimation (e.g., Haunss 2007), and some recent research has attempted
to examine the ways in which social movements can gain legitimacy in the
eyes of the public (Andrews, Beyerlein, and Tucker 2015). In later sections,
we will discuss how leaders might try to resolve legitimacy crises within a
movement by appealing to public legitimacy.
Zald and Ash (1966, p. 335) argued that an important reason that a
movement organisation may fail is its “inability to maintain legitimacy even
in the eyes of its supporters.” Legitimacy problems emerge when marginal
organisations within the same social movement industry attempt to dif-
ferentiate their tactics and visions from those of major organisations, since
attacking one another’s legitimacy can be useful in the competition for re-
sources (Zald and McCarthy 1980, pp. 5-10; Soule and King 2008). Snow
and Benford (1992, p. 150) pointed out that a legitimacy problem might
appear when a “master frame” connecting different participants is chal-
lenged by competing frames. In other words, leaders “can mobilize legiti-
macy […] only when they are able to frame the grievances and interests of
aggrieved constituencies […] provide solutions, and enable collective attri-
bution processes to operate” (Rao, Morrill, and Zald 2000, p. 242). Legiti-
macy is important for the survival of an organisation and a movement, but
it is unclear how or in what way legitimacy concerns affect leadership and
thus the movement. In studies of the impact of leadership dynamics on
movement outcomes, the agential view suggests that types of leadership
are independent variables that significantly shape the outcomes of move-
ments, whereas the “contingency view,” while recognising the crucial role
of leaders, sees leaders as “essentially servants of their followers” (Aminzade,
Goldstone, and Perry 2001, p. 127; Dinh et al. 2014). These perspectives pro-
vide illuminating insights into whether and how leaders can influence move-
ments; yet, leaders’ agency is also heavily influenced by whether a
legitimacy problem is settled. Our view resembles that of Snow and Benford
(1992) in that we see leaders as “acting as intermediaries”: they mobilise
the public and make strategic decisions, but do not do so as they please
(Aminzade et al. 2001, p. 127). Advancing this literature, the present article
aims to show: (1) how the legitimation problem can be an independent and
significant factor that shapes the course and outcomes of a large-scale
movement, even when major actors have predicted the problem and ac-
tively sought solutions prior to the beginning of the movement; (2) that le-
gitimation challenges from participants can confine leaders’ agency and
direct their attention toward internal conflicts; and (3) the actual process
through which these dynamics play out.
Leaders are critical to social movements. They perform significant tasks
that are necessary for sustained campaigns of collective claim-making
(McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001; Tarrow 2011, p. 12), including articulating
ideology, engaging the public, making strategic and tactical decisions, and
so on (Cai 2017, p. 4; Earl 2007; Ganz 2010; Morris and Staggenborg 2004).
Their legitimacy is crucial to the effective coordination of collective claim-
making because it requires the cooperation and obedience of participants.
There are four primary approaches of legitimation, by which we mean the
types of legitimacy claims that leaders make to gain authority over volun-
tary participants.
Weberian Charismatic Approach: A dominant approach to understanding
leadership legitimation is the “Weberian” charismatic approach. Weber’s
(1947) three conceptions of authority – legal, traditional, and charismatic
– are useful tools for conceptualising leadership legitimacy (Morris and
Staggenborg 2004; Platt and Lilley 1994). This approach explains leaders’
legitimacy based on their charismatic personality, purity, and credibility. (1)
Functional Approach: Robert Michels’ (1962) work provides an organisa-
tional perspective that elucidates the legitimation process. Large move-
ments require large organisations. Large organisations cannot avoid
hierarchy, and hierarchy requires people who are capable of carrying out
necessary tasks. Thus, leaders’ legitimacy is justified by their functional ne-
cessity (i.e., their successful completion of coordinating tasks) in the hier-
archy (Michels 1962; Morris and Staggenborg 2004). (2)
Consensual Approach: The democratic nature of civil society increases de-
mands to respect every participant in the decision-making process. The re-
sult is the widespread use of the consensual decision-making model in social
movements (Kaldor 2003; Mansbridge 2003; Tarrow 2011, p. 11; Wapner
1995, p. 313). Nevertheless, consensus can be achieved through various
means other than democratic voting, such as surveying and incorporating
ground-level opinions into the decision-making process, forming delibera-
tive fora among major groups, etc.
Democratic Approach: Once a legitimacy crisis emerges, leaders can utilise
fair democratic voting to resolve disputes and conflicts (Toepfl 2017). (3)
Theoretically, these four mechanisms can be distinguished from one an-
other; however, in practice, leaders often employ more than one single
mechanism to legitimise the decision-making hierarchy. While a specific le-
gitimating mechanism might be able to resolve several legitimacy problems
at once, it would fail to achieve the same in other periods when participants
come to demand more than what it can offer. Changes in legitimation re-
quirements can significantly affect leaders’ major decisions, since the de-
cline of legitimacy often leads to demobilisation (Tilly and Tarrow 2015, pp.
97–98). The multiplicity and fluidity of legitimation mechanisms and the
ways in which they interact with changing group conditions are important
in explaining the growth or degeneration of a movement. The UM is a valu-
able case for exploring this topic because most of the major strategic
choices that affected the course of the movement revolved around issues
of legitimation.
Research context
The UM, which lasted for 79 days (from 28 September to 15 December
2014), was the largest social movement in Hong Kong’s recent history. At
first, the play was to host an occupying movement (called the “Occupy
Central Movement” [OC]) in Central for a relatively short period of time;
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1. In elaborating the Weberian charismatic leader, Aminzade, Goldstone, and Perry (2001) argued
that charisma means the abilities and attributes of a person that make him capable of evoking
“emotions that create a community of feeling” or revoking “emotions by creating affective dissi-
dence that leads followers to rethink their worldviews.” Therefore, we see purity as a kind of
charisma because it leads participants to believe that a person is “working for a public good, rather
than personal advantage,” which can be an important condition for mobilising emotions and sym-
pathy (Aminzade et al. 2001, pp. 129-130).
2. To clarify, a leader does not automatically become a legitimate leader simply because he is a
leader. Instead, the functional approach emphasises that a leader can raise a claim to legitimacy
based on the successful completion of important tasks attached to a leadership position. Partic-
ipants’ acceptance of such a claim will depend on many factors, but the most important of these
(according to this approach) is whether the leader is the best person to fulfil the functional tasks
of the position. We thank the anonymous reviewers for this point.
3. The democratic approach is very similar to Weber’s rational-legal authority, since the latter high-
lights a bureaucracy’s legally established “patterns of normative rules” as the sources of its legit-
imacy. Although these patterns are usually seen as the foundation of democracy, this is not
necessarily the case. A major critique of Weber (1947, p. 328) is that such legal-rational authority
did exist in Imperial China (Turner 2008). 
Articles
however, the movement unexpectedly grew into an occupying initiative
spanning three sites (Admiralty, Causeway Bay, and Mongkok) after police
officers fired 87 canisters of tear gas at the protesters (Tang 2015). The
abrupt transformation from the OC to the UM raises three important
questions: (1) Who were the leaders, and who were they representing? (2)
How did the sudden change challenge leaders’ legitimacy and affect their
decisions? (3) What were the legitimating mechanisms being adopted by
the leadership coalition, and how did they affect the movement? This ar-
ticle contributes to the extant literature by providing a more nuanced in-
quiry into the UM leadership’s decision-making from the perspective of
legitimacy. Below, we explicate several of the major themes identified in
studies of the UM and explain our potential contributions.
The first line of UM research examines mobilisation in terms of the struc-
tural and historical contingencies of protests in Hong Kong. Identity politics
is a major focus of this stream (Rühlig 2016, p. 62). Activists believe that
the Beijing government has failed to fulfil its promise to implement univer-
sal suffrage (Davis 2015; Veg 2015), and Hong Kong’s under-preparation for
regional integration since 2009 has given rise to an anti-mainland sentiment
(Lui 2015). The concentration of political power and economic capital in
the hands of corporations and pro-establishment politicians has resulted in
not only social inequality but also an accumulation of citizens’ grievances
against mainland China’s influence and social inequality (Hui and Lau 2015;
Ortman 2015). These studies situate the movement’s mobilisation within
Hong Kong’s historical context and identity formation. In addition to iden-
tity politics, this stream of literature has highlighted the ways in which UM
repertories were conditioned by antecedent events (Cheng 2016, p. 384).
For example, the UM’s discursive frames were shaped in part by “Tiananmen
veterans” (e.g., “Occupy Central with Love and Peace”; hereafter OCLP) and
their fear of violent crackdowns (Lagerkvist and Rühlig 2016). The OCLP’s
campaign of civil disobedience helped the occupation gain public legitimacy
(Lee 2015). The “Anti-Moral and National Education Movement” organised
by Scholarism in 2012 also cultivated anti-mainland Chinese government
sentiments and provided the UM with tactical and discursive resources
(Wang 2017). This literature provides precious insights into the structural
conditions that enable and constrain the UM’s mobilisation and protest tac-
tics. Yet, as Cheng and Chan (2017, p. 224) argued, there is a need to further
examine how and why the movement evolved over time through a focus
on contingent events and their interactions with the existing structure. This
article ties in with these insights by demonstrating how a series of legiti-
macy crises caused different legitimating mechanisms at specific points in
time. More importantly, the article seeks to explain the internal constraints
affecting the agency of movement leaders.
The second stream of literature has explored the spontaneous nature of
the movement by looking at contingent events (Cheng and Chan 2017) and
different UM groups’ occupation practices. The spontaneity of the move-
ment provided space for protesters to create personal action frames (Veg
2016), articulate a playful form of protest (Gan 2017), and conduct a “lead-
erless” movement (Lin and Liu 2016). However, leaders did exist, and they
performed mobilisation and framing functions within the UM (Cai 2017,
pp. 11-12; Cheng and Chan 2017, p. 223). Wong (2015) and Chan (2015)
highlighted the intensification of inter-group conflicts throughout the UM,
and Cheng and Chan (2017) found a lack of consensus concerning who was
the legitimate leader. In general, however, these studies have not sufficiently
accounted for how or why the movement’s legitimacy transformed over
time. One exception is Lee’s (2016) study of the construction of public opin-
ion in newspaper discourse. As he argued, public opinion might have affected
the movement leaders’ decisions, especially since “the images of a pro-re-
treat public constituted a consideration against escalating the action” (Lee
2016, p. 605). The present paper contributes to understanding how and why
the UM leadership failed to sustain the movement’s legitimacy over time. 
A third focal point in the literature is the “emergence of a new digital counter-
public sphere” (Rühlig 2016, p. 62). The rise of digital media enabled a crucial
form of mobilisation in the UM – that is, a seemingly “leaderless” connective
action (Lee, So, and Leung 2015) – by allowing individuals to circulate alter-
native information about the movement outside the traditional news media
and to utilise their highly personalised digital networks for political mobilisation
(Lee and Chan 2016). Protesters creatively articulated media practices to fa-
cilitate mobilisation (Lee and Ting 2015; Lin 2017), build identities, and express
emotions (Rühlig 2016; Veg 2016). While this stream of literature shows that
individuals participated in the UM in their own ways, the present article en-
hances the understanding of how both leaders and protestors played important
roles that shaped the movement’s course and outcomes by focusing on the
leadership’s attempt to account for protesters’ highly personalised visions of
the movement in their decision-making processes.
Method and data
This study utilised (1) semi-structured interviews with the major leaders
of the UM, (2) materials available on relevant organisations’ websites and
Facebook pages, and (3) news coverage and commentary of the UM avail-
able on WiseNews.
We conducted six in-depth, semi-structured interviews with core activists
from the OCLP, Hong Kong Federation of Students (HKFS), and key civil so-
ciety organisations (CSOs) in 2015 and 2016. The interviewees were respon-
sible for a variety of leadership works and roles within the UM, which are
listed in Table 1. Three of the interviewees were core members of the lead-
ership coalition and took part in the decision-making process; another three
were “bridging leaders” who connected the leadership coalition with ordinary
protesters (Robnett 1996); they performed “bridging tasks,” such as dissem-
inating messages from the leadership coalition to ground-level protesters.
Of the three “bridging leaders,” one was also responsible for coordinating
pickets; the other two were responsible for day-to-day logistics support for
the occupation sites. We asked the interviewees about their perspectives on
the movement, the struggles they faced, and the rationales behind the de-
cisions they made. Informed consent was acquired. To protect the intervie-
wees’ identities, each interviewee will be referred to in the present text by a
speaker ID (P1 to P6). All interviews were conducted on campus at the Chi-
nese University of Hong Kong, except for the interview with P6, which was
conducted at the University of Hong Kong (HKU). Each interview lasted be-
tween 45 and 80 minutes. We also drew upon data from websites and Face-
book pages for the OCLP, HKFS, and Scholarism to map the contexts of the
various legitimating mechanisms. Relevant news coverage and commentary
were derived from a keywords search (e.g., “leadership in the UM”). We
utilised the news materials to identify the leadership coalitions’ major deci-
sions and potential dynamics. These data sources help to triangulate the
findings (Maxwell 2013) and provide a richer picture of the UM. 
We employ Sewell’s (1996) event-centred approach to analyse the evo-
lution of legitimating mechanisms within the UM. As Sewell (1996, p. 843)
suggested, events are “sequences of occurrences that result in transforma-
tions of structures” instead of happenings. Such sequences may begin with
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a rupture of routine practice, but “most ruptures are neutralized and reab-
sorbed into the pre-existing structures in one way or another” (Sewell 1996,
p. 843). An occurrence becomes an event when it can significantly transform
existing structures and processes by “disrupting, altering, or violating the
taken-for-granted assumptions governing routine political and social rela-
tions” (McAdam and Sewell 2001, p. 110, emphasis in the original text) in
a social movement. How political actors interpret and strategically respond
to an antecedent event may influence later events (Lee and Chan 2011,
p. 8). Hence, social movements can be seen as path-dependent, bounded
sequences of events. This approach is helpful for analysing how particular
contingent events (1) shape the underlying structure and path of collective
action (Cheng 2016, p. 384) and (2) escalate and deescalate conflicts over
time (McAdam and Sewell 2001, pp. 122-125). 
We analyse contingent events with a focus on how the UM leadership in-
terpreted them and made decisions about legitimating mechanisms at spe-
cific points in time. These events were identified for two reasons: first, our
interviewees emphasised them as significant sources of legitimacy crises in
the UM, and second, these events triggered the UM leadership’s strategic
responses and altered legitimating mechanisms. We continuously alternated
between gathering and analysing the data (Glaser and Strauss 1967, p. 102).
This iterative research process allowed us to follow up on emerging themes
in subsequent interviews and, thus, helped us constantly refine and reinte-
grate our theoretical and empirical inquiry.
Legitimating mechanisms in the “Occupy
Central Movement”
We first explicate the legitimating mechanisms in the OC through which
certain conceptions of legitimacy were formulated. The antecedents are dis-
cussed to situate the organisational constraints of later events. The OC was
the precursor of the UM. It was a planned and centralised collective action
prior to which the public had only a limited understanding of civil disobedi-
ence (Lee 2015, p. 394). Legitimacy is of particular importance for promoting
contentious politics; specifically, the OCLP had to justify that “the tactic is
just and right – from the perspective of those who are going to perform it”
and to earn its “legitimacy in the eyes of others” (Biggs 2013, p. 409). 
We might not use the term [legitimacy] directly, but this was indeed
one of the considerations. From the very beginning, we [leaders of the
OC] issued the letter of faith, providing a blueprint of how we would
organise the movement; these are all grand principles […]. Nonethe-
less, when it came to the details of the organisation of the occupation,
we tried to make the decision-making process as transparent and as
inclusive as possible; we did not want to be the sole decision-makers.
Legitimacy was the chief concern of this move: an inclusive and trans-
parent decision-making process tended to gain higher legitimacy. (4)
Benny Tai first introduced the concept of civil disobedience to the public
in 2013 (Tai 2013). Later, he, together with Kin Man Chan and Yiu-Ming
Chu, founded OCLP to support this idea and pertinent collective actions.
OCLP emphasised the movement’s strictly non-violent principle, as the
purpose was to awaken the political consciousness of the public and to
eventually generate public pressure for genuine democracy. The campaign
inevitably had to address the city’s longstanding culture of “peaceful”
protest (Lee 2015, pp. 396-397). The three “deliberation days” (D-Days 1,
2, and 3), two “civil referendums,” and other campaigns served as “a trans-
parent democratic procedure” to legitimise the collective action by en-
abling participants to discuss the movement’s stance and strategies (Chan
2015, pp. 2-3). During the D-Days, OCLP invited core members of pan-
democratic parties and CSOs to discuss the principles of the occupation.
Using random sampling phone invitations, they also invited the general
public to join the first D-Day. Only a small fraction of invited citizens (i.e.,
95), however, attended. People who signed the “letter of intent,” which
was a promise to defer to OCLP’s collective decisions, were allowed to
vote for three out of more than ten movement proposals. To increase the
public legitimacy of the movement, the three proposals were then incor-
porated into a public referendum to determine the final plan. 
These legitimating mechanisms, however, offered limited degrees of in-
clusiveness. Though most information concerning purposes and strategies
was transparent and the “civil referendums” provided opportunities for the
public to endorse the movement, individuals had to agree with the three
basic beliefs of OCLP in order to qualify as members, and during D-Days,
the agenda-setting power was held exclusively by members. According to
an interviewee from OCLP:
We were launching a movement. If you agree with it, you can come
and join, while if you disagree, you can remain outside. No one forced
anybody to join it. (5)
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4. Interview with P6, 21 April 2016.
5. Interview with P6, 21 April 2016.
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Table 1 – Interviewees’ background information
Interviewee Role in the Umbrella Movement Interview Date
P1
A bridging leader who was responsible for managing the picket team in the Admiralty occupied site and facilitating
coordination between the leadership coalition and CSOs.
21 August 2015
P2 A core member of the leadership coalition who participated in the decision-making process. 7 September 2015
P3








A bridging leader who was responsible for organizing helpers, undertaking logistics support in the Admiralty occupied
site, and facilitating coordination between the leadership coalition and CSOs.
10 September 2015
P6 A core member of the leadership coalition who participated in the decision-making process. 21 April 2016
Note: We conducted interviews with the first five informants (P1 to P5) on campus at The Chinese University of Hong Kong. The interview with P6 was conducted on campus at
The University of Hong Kong.
OCLP expected to launch the occupation movement in Central, the major
business area, on 1 October 2014, and all participants were required to obey
the Manual of Disobedience (OCLP 2014). The occupation was expected to
last only a few days before moving on to the stage of peaceful and volun-
tary arrests. In the original plan, OCLP was the only leader, and the CSOs
and student organisations were expected to play subsidiary roles. Though a
coordination committee did exist, OCLP held exclusive decision-making
power. (6) A top-down hierarchy was formed to reduce potential inter-or-
ganisation conflicts.
At this stage, D-Days and civil referendums were considered consensual
building and democratic legitimation approaches. Through the deliberations,
the OCLP hoped to acquire consensus and legitimacy among members, and
through the civil referendums, it aspired to gain public support without giv-
ing non-members agenda-setting power. The top-down organisational
structure was justified by its functional necessity in sustaining and coordi-
nating the agreed-upon plan. 
Legitimacy crises and legitimating
mechanisms in the Umbrella Movement
As one interviewee stated, “The occurrence of the UM did not follow the
script planned by OCLP.” (7) Instead, following a more proactive imagination
of civil disobedience (Chan 2015; Wong 2015), the student organisations
stormed Civic Square in Admiralty on 26 September 2014. This represented
an unplanned event in the OC’s script, and it compelled the three OCLP
leaders to launch the OC unexpectedly on 28 September (Cai 2017, pp. 47-
48). The protest swiftly transformed into a large-scale occupation in three
locations: Admiralty, Mongkok, and Causeway Bay.
This unprecedented development altered the understanding of the move-
ment’s leadership. Though OCLP was originally perceived to be the sole le-
gitimate leader, according to surveys conducted in the occupied sites in
October, most participants were not mobilised by OCLP (Cheng and Chan
2017, pp. 225-229; Chan and Lee 2014). An on-site survey conducted by
Cheng and Chan (2017) showed that only 17.7% of participants viewed
OCLP as a legitimate leader, whereas 56.5% regarded the HKFS to be a le-
gitimate leader (Cheng and Chan 2017, p. 225). (8) The changes in the move-
ment’s implementation and timeline had created uncertainties and
delegitimised OCLP’s authority. 
The remaining sections explore how the ways in which UM leadership ar-
ticulated different legitimacy claims over various events revealed potential
disruptions to participants’ beliefs in the movement’s claim to legitimacy
during each phase. 
Legitimation mechanism 1: The “Five-Party Platform”
The de-legitimisation of OCLP’s leadership began when it declared that it
would launch the OC campaign on 28 September. Many protesters fiercely
criticised OCLP as “hijacking” the student strike, and some protesters even
demanded that the leadership clarify that the student occupation was not
part of the OC campaign. (9) Some citizens left Civic Square to protest OCLP.
This bottom-up challenge to OCLP leadership’s legitimacy was unexpected,
since OCLP leaders saw the early announcement of the OC campaign as a
way of formally activating resources in support of the students’ action,
rather than as an attempt to take it over. In response to this crisis, members
of the HKFS, who were responsible for speaking at the “Big Stage,” (10) at-
tempted to re-consolidate protesters by shifting the focus to the move-
ment’s values and visions. (11) OCLP eventually gave up its sole leadership,
transitioning to an assistant role in which it “managed the occupied sites
and offered suggestions to the students’ decision-making.” (12)
These unexpected events shifted the movement’s leadership from OCLP
to the HKFS and Scholarism. The outcomes were conditioned by the an-
tecedent events (Cheng 2016). Because of the OC campaign, OCLP was still
responsible for the mobilisation of human and financial resources. Some
members of CSOs and volunteers still recognised OCLP as the primary le-
gitimate leader. Hence, student leaders had to account for OCLP’s voice in
their decision-making processes. The increasing involvement of CSOs and
pan-democratic parties since the second week of the movement had further
complicated the situation. Both the HKFS and OCLP recognised the need
to establish a legitimate decision-making mechanism to address the issues
of representativeness, cooperation, and inter-group conflicts in a long-term
occupation. Together, the HKFS, Scholarism, OCLP, CSOs, and pan-democ-
racy political parties (13) formed the “Five-Party Platform” (hereafter “the
Platform”) in October: 
In the first few days, we [OCLP, CSOs, and pan-democracy political
parties] made the best effort to accommodate students’ decisions.
However, oftentimes, student representatives had to go back and
discuss with their standing committee members what we all had
agreed on. Sometimes, due to the disagreement of these committee
members, we had to overthrow the previous mutual agreement and
re-launch the discussion again. This created a huge problem in our
decision-making process […]. [H]owever, starting from the second
week of the movement, most CSOs had already entered the occu-
pation, and pan-democratic political parties and legislators had also
joined the Platform. Students [could] no longer be the sole decision-
maker in the movement. We had to come up with a platform to co-
ordinate decision-making among different parties. (14)
The Platform was designed to facilitate collaboration among organisa-
tions, with the hope that improved communication would give their deci-
sions greater legitimacy. In theory, the Platform was expected to help
legitimise important decisions among major groups and supporters; how-
ever, it failed to function effectively as a decision-making mechanism. First,
the Platform had no binding power, and groups were not forced to obey its
decisions or agreements. (15) Unlike supra-organisations, such as the “feder-
ations” and “alliances” discussed by Zald and McCarthy (1980, pp. 14-15),
the Platform did not require political actors to give up their discretionary
rights; neither did it attribute power to any one actor. Instead, the various
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6. Interview with P1, 21 August 2015.
7. Interview with P6, 21 April 2016.
8. In addition to OCLP and the HKFS, 29% of survey respondents viewed another student organisa-
tion, Scholarism, to be a legitimate leader, and 34.7% considered the movement to be leaderless. 
9. “Students Accuse Occupy Central of Hijacking Their Protest,” South China Morning Post, 29
September 2014.
10. The “Big Stage” was a tall stage in the Admiralty occupation site that leaders used to disseminate
messages to protestors.
11. Interviews with P3 and P4, 9 and 10 September 2015.
12. Interview with P6, 21 April 2016.
13. Hereafter, we call the five groups the “leadership coalition.” 
14. Interview with P6, 21 April 2016.
15. Interviews with P1 and P2, 21 August and 7 September 2015, and with P6, 21 April 2016.
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participating organisations viewed the Platform merely as a mechanism for
coordinating logistics support and informing other organisations of their
own decisions, largely overlooking the Platform’s intended consensus-build-
ing and deliberative functions. (16)
Secondly, the Platform failed to facilitate mutual trust. (17) Organisations
had different imaginations of the constituencies, and these differences trans-
lated into disagreements over the most effective means of achieving the
movement’s goals. OCLP viewed protestors and the public as equally impor-
tant constituencies; thus, it insisted on a principle of strict non-violence as
a necessary condition to avoid public antipathy to the movement. Pan-
democratic parties shared the same conception concerning the movement’s
constituencies, but believed that long-term occupation would unavoidably
cause public antipathy; therefore, they argued that the movement should
transition into other forms of “uncooperative movements.” (18) They at-
tempted to balance both public and participant legitimacy. In contrast, HKFS
and Scholarism had more proactive imaginations of the movement. As we
will discuss with respect to “occupied area voting,” the students’ conception
of the constituencies leaned heavily towards the participants. In a platform
of binding decision mechanisms, groups may have greater incentives to con-
vince and negotiate with the opposite side; however, in the absence of such
a mechanism, the Platform became merely a place for exposing differences.
The tension began to intensify in late October, when opinion polls indicated
declining general support for the UM (Lee 2016, p. 600). 
Thirdly, the HKFS’ internal “universal consensus” structure posed signifi-
cant difficulties. The HKFS was a student organisation formed by the student
unions of eight tertiary education institutions. According to its own rules,
the organisation’s decisions required a consensus of all member student
unions; hence, its representatives in the Platform were not allowed to reach
final decisions on behalf of the organisation without discussing these deci-
sions with the other groups. 
Since the Platform offered protesters no direct channels of participation,
the protestors had to rely on their supported organisations to express their
concerns. However, these organisations generally had no formal mecha-
nisms for collecting supporters’ opinions. 
Legitimating mechanism 2: Occupied area voting
How can we legitimise our decisions in the occupation sites? […]
Even the “Five-Party Platform” had insufficient inclusiveness and le-
gitimacy… Then, we came to the thought that a referendum might
be the best solution. That is, all the participants can come back to
the occupation sites and actually vote for a decision that they do in-
deed favour […] The referendum was designed to solve the problem
of legitimacy. (19)
“Occupied area voting” is considered to be another contingent event that
triggered a legitimacy crisis in the UM. This legitimating mechanism was
intended to be a democratic procedure to empower the pro-democratic
public and the movement’s participants. Alex Chow made clear that the ra-
tionale behind the voting was to gain public endorsement of the occupa-
tion. (20) The leadership coalition attempted to claim legitimacy by turning
the movement participants and the public into decision-makers. 
On 24 October 2014, the leadership coalition announced that it would hold
the vote at the occupied Admiralty site on 26 October (see Table 2). Protesters,
however, disagreed with the motions and the agenda-setting. They denounced
the “Admiralty-orientated” voting as isolating the other two sites, and they
also worried that anti-UM groups might hijack the movement, since no ar-
rangement could effectively distinguish real participants from non-partici-
pants. For protesters, the vote was only a way to provide the leadership with
legitimate excuses to end the movement. In response to these challenges, the
leadership coalition revised the wording of the motions, expanded the voting
to include all occupied sites, extended the voting period, and promised that
the voting was not intended to end the UM. The revisions still failed to satisfy
protestors. On 26 October, the Platform decided to cancel the vote. 
The negotiations regarding occupied area voting represented one of the
major conflicts between OCLP and the student organisations. As mentioned
by an interviewee from OCLP, initially, all parties in the Platform reached a
consensus concerning the need for the vote; however, soon after the vote’s
announcement, representatives from the HKFS claimed that the vote was
not approved by their members. (21) OCLP and the pan-democracy parties
saw a “withdrawal mechanism as a necessity because of the declining public
sympathy to the movement,” (22) while the HKFS wanted an enduring oc-
cupation, which they considered to be the desire of the participants. (23) The
conflict could be understood as follows: OCLP had a more inclusive view of
“the constituency,” suggesting that all citizens who supported the move-
ment could cast a vote to decide the movement’s future, whereas the HKFS
valued movement participants’ opinions more than the opinions of the pub-
lic. This difference in opinion reflects two prominent questions that face all
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16. “[Hou yusan yantaohui] Huang Zhifeng: Xu jiantao ruhe naru bentupai ji suren yijian” ([Post-um-
brella movement seminar] Joshua Wong: We need to review how to take the views of localists
and ordinary people into consideration), Independent Media, 3 September 2015, http://www.in-
mediahk.net/node/1037170 (accessed on 25 May 2017).
17. Interviews with P1 and P2, 21 August and 7 September 2015, and with P6, 21 April 2016.
18. Interview with P6, 21 April 2016.
19. Interview with P6, 21 April 2016.
20. “Zhou Yongkang: Weilai bixu quangang toupiao” (Alex Chow: Hong Kong people will need to vote
for the future), Ming Pao, 25 October 2014.
21. Interview with P6, 21 April 2016.
22. Interview with P6, 21 April 2016.
23. Interviews with P2 and P3, 7 and 9 September 2015.
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Table 2 – The “occupied area voting” timeline
Date Timeline
24 October 2014
The “Five-Party Platform” announced it would hold “occupied area voting” on 26 October to let UM supporters express their views
concerning the two proposals made by the government.
25 October 2014
The “Five-Party Platform” changed the wording of the two motions to be more progressive, and expanded the voting to include all
Admiralty, Mongkok, and Causeway Bay occupied areas. They also extended the voting period to 27 October.
• Voter requirement: Voters must confirm that they understand the contents of the two motions and support the Umbrella
Movement.
26 October 2014 The “Five-Party Platform” announced the cancellation of the “occupied area voting.”
Source: Authors’ summary of news coverage in Apple Daily and Ming Pao and OCLP’s website.
large-scale social movements: Who are the people? Whose voice should
count? The primary divide between the two groups stemmed from their re-
spective views on the limits of the leaders’ authority. A core member of
OCLP said:
Those [decision-makers] who oppose the referendum refuse to del-
egate the power of decision back to the participants. A referendum
was unavoidably a way of giving back the decision-making power
to the participants. If there were a democratic voting procedure,
every participant would have a right to decide upon whether the
occupation should end or not. I believe, from the perspective of
the participants, it was not up to us, as main organisers of the
movement, to make such [an] important decision. It was reason-
able for them to question our legitimacy to make such a huge de-
cision. (24)
Some HKFS members, in contrast, considered the voting to be an ineffec-
tive withdrawal mechanism and believed that solidarity among participants
was more important than democratic and public legitimacy:
Assuming the result of the voting was that the majority of people had
voted to leave, what if some of the participants were unwilling to comply
with the result and decided to stay in the occupation sites? Of course,
those who voted to leave could definitely leave, but who were going to
take care of those who decided to remain? Sometimes, a democratic
procedure might not be the best solution to a controversy. (25)
The event revealed that movement leaders were significantly constrained
by bottom-up legitimacy challenges. An important factor that led OCLP to
propose the voting was the inability of the leadership coalition to solve the
already growing legitimacy concerns raised by participants. The fierce de-
bates regarding the duration and legitimacy of the occupation had also re-
sulted in a damaging split within the leadership coalition. This legitimacy
crisis affected not only the leader–participant relationship, but also the
leader–leader relationship. 
Legitimating mechanism 3: Opening the “Big Stage”
and on-site mini-forums
Despite the unsuccessful pursuit of direct democratic legitimacy, the lead-
ership coalition realised that alternative strategies were needed to soften
the protesters’ anger. To this end, they opened the “Big Stage” and organised
on-site mini-forum discussions in each of the occupied sites. Table 3 lists the
major occurrences surrounding the protesters’ challenges to the “Big Stage.” 
Mongkok protesters ridiculed the legitimacy of the UM’s leadership with
the slogan “You [the leaders] don’t represent me.” Though it was commonly
understood that protesters in Admiralty adhered more to the leadership, an
interviewee from the picket team informed us that even there, the authority
of the pickets had been increasingly challenged by protesters since Octo-
ber. (26) OCLP and the HKFS repeatedly endeavoured to justify the picket
team by its functional necessity; nonetheless, the team’s collapsed legiti-
macy reached a breaking point on 8 November, when Jack Lee (2014), a
protester and an HKU student, proclaimed that the pickets forbade him
from speaking on the “Big Stage” because he might “threaten the leader-
ship” by stating his belief that violent resistance was necessary to force the
political authority to make concessions. Though Joshua Wong soon clarified
that leaders welcomed transparent dialogue, by that point, the indignation
surrounding the “Big Stage” was deeply rooted in the various communities
of protesters. 
The 8 November event created ruptures in the relatively top-down lead-
ership structure, forcing the leadership coalition to develop a strategic re-
sponse to the disgruntled protesters. Despite the disagreements on strategy,
all members in the leadership coalition agreed on the principle of non-vio-
lence. Given the impossibility of directly satisfying radical protesters’ de-
mands, the leadership coalition decided to open the “Big Stage” for
protesters to publicly express their views: 
You have to provide an opportunity for them to release their emo-
tions, since we had observed that protestors had already questioned
the legitimacy of the leadership. Some of them might have problems
with the legitimacy of the leadership, but their main dissatisfaction
was due to the fact that there was no platform for them to publicly ex-
press their opinions and vent their anger. Opening the “Big Stage” can
be an effective way to resolve such dissatisfaction. If we did not do so,
and their anger cannot be mitigated, eventually they would completely
overthrow the leadership. Therefore, rendering such a platform for in-
dignant protestors was the best way to maintain the leadership. (27)
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25. Interview with P4, 10 September 2015.
26. Interview with P1, 21 August 2015.
27. Interview with P1, 21 August 2015.
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Table 3 – Major occurrences concerning the protesters’ challenges to the “Big Stage”
Date Occurrence
8 November 2014 A protester claimed that the “Big Stage” (including the chief of picket, Kwok) forbade him from expressing his view publicly. 
9 November 2014 The “Big Stage” in Admiralty was opened for protesters to express their views publicly.
18 November 2014
A group of protesters organized a more radical protest to occupy the Legco building; however, some of them claimed the “Big Stage” 
did not allow them to do so.
21 November 2014 About one hundred protesters denounced the student leaders and OCLP, and called for disbanding the pickets.
24 November 2014 Some protesters criticized the pickets in Admiralty. 
30 November 2014 HKFS organized a more radical protest as an attempt to occupy the Central Government Complex.
1 December 2014
Kam-mun Cheng asked the HKFS and Scholarism to conduct an open dialogue with him. The staff of the “Big Stage” sought to stop his
speech, and this led to conflicts among protesters.
Source: Authors’ summary of news coverage in Apple Daily and Scholarism’s Facebook page.
Opening the “Big Stage” created a channel through which protesters could
relieve their anger towards the movement’s leadership, and many protesters
believed that through this channel, the leaders would receive and consider
their opinions. However, opening the “Big Stage” also created opportunities
for radicals to diffuse their animosity towards the leadership coalition. One
such event occurred on 1 December when Kam-mun Cheng, a key figure
within the radical protesters’ community, used the “Big Stage” to excoriate
the HKFS’s decision to storm the Central Government Complex. For the rad-
icals, the outcome of the movement was a vital factor in deciding the extent
to which the leadership coalition could represent them. Consequently, the
failure associated with storming the Central Government Complex deep-
ened the tensions between the leadership coalition and the radicals. 
Beginning in mid-October, the HKFS and OCLP also organised “mini-forum
discussions” in all occupied sites. The chief purpose of these discussions was
to show that the movement was not “leaderless”: 
The three leaders of OCLP must stay in the occupation sites […].
They had to be seen by the participants, just like Alex Chow and
Lester Shum [leaders of the HKFS] must be seen in the Mongkok site
[…]. Since mid-October, the HKFS had established a station to
demonstrate that they were in the occupation site. (28)
The leadership coalition sought to use this presence of symbolic leaders
to connect the leadership with the protesters and to enable protesters to
express their views and anger directly to the leaders. However, although the
mini-forums did offer another source of information input, the leadership
did not take this new input seriously. A number of interviewees claimed that
the leadership already understood the protesters’ viewpoints well; therefore,
it was unnecessary to build a bridging mechanism to include participants
in the decision-making process. (29)
Legitimating mechanism 4: Legco members’
resignation and referendum
Following the announcement of on-site occupied area voting on 24 Oc-
tober, the HKFS offered a counter-proposal on 25 October, calling for a de
facto referendum through the resignation of the pan-democratic legislative
councillors (see Table 4). The student organisations’ push for this mecha-
nism, which was intended to increase public legitimacy, was triggered by
the failure of the occupied area voting initiative. Poll findings and pertinent
news reports from late October onwards indicated that the majority of cit-
izens were in favour of a UM retreat (Lee 2016, pp. 599-602). Later, in early
November, Alex Chow and Joshua Wong realised and explicitly stated that
mainstream public support was crucial for the movement’s continuation
(Wong 2014). (30) According to Hong Kong law, the resignation of a legislative
councillor triggers a re-election in the councillor’s district. A “referendum”
is triggered when at least one pan-democratic legislator from all five elec-
toral districts resigns from his position. Since every citizen would have
known the rationale behind the councillors’ resignations, the re-election of
pan-democratic candidates could be seen as an indirect authorisation of
the movement and the direction of its leadership. 
By contrast, the major concern of the OCLP and the pan-democratic parties
was whether the referendum could function as an effective withdrawal mech-
anism. Pan-democratic parties, such as the Democratic Party and the Civil
Party, were worried about the potential costs of the referendum: specifically,
if they failed to be re-elected, the pro-establishment would have enough votes
to pass the electoral reform package. Therefore, they vetoed the proposal. In
the interview with P2, we were told that Albert Ho had agreed to resign during
the UM; however, since the student leaders did not agree to use the referen-
dum to end the movement, the proposal was finally turned down. (31)
Conclusion
The article has shown that (1) legitimacy is not a settled issue, even in an
apparently voluntary movement, and (2) legitimacy crises can significantly
affect group coordination and leader-level decisions. From the above four
legitimating mechanisms, we observe a process of “forced democratisation.”
When protestors begin to articulate alternative visions of a movement, they
demand responses from their leaders. Leaders must then search for potential
claims of legitimacy to resolve these bottom-up pressures. Oftentimes, the
solution involves a more transparent and inclusive decision-making process.
In the case of the UM, when the leadership encountered bottom-up pres-
sures, the movement’s Weberian charismatic and functional approach grad-
ually developed into a consensual-oriented approach and then – when this
change failed to diminish the pressures – a democratic approach.
From the very beginning, the leaders of OCLP had anticipated this problem
and had made OCLP extremely democratic by employing both consensual
and democratic approaches at almost every stage of the intragroup deci-
sion-making process. However, the sudden transformation of the OC cam-
paign into the UM interrupted this mechanism. When the movement began
to include participants who were not loyal adherents of the OC’s plan, OCLP
leaders faced bottom-up pressure to re-legitimise their leadership. They first
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28. Interview with P2, 7 September 2015.
29. Interviews with P2 and P4, 7 and 9 September 2015, and with P6, 21 April 2016.
30. “Zhou Yongkang: Bian xiang gong tou she qu zhan kai zheng shi min zhi chi” (Alex Chow: Getting
support from Hong Kong citizens through launching of De Facto Referendum), Ming Pao, 2
November 2014.
31. Interview with P2, 7 September 2015.
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Table 4 – The Legco members’ resignation and referendum timeline
Date Occurrence
25 October 2014 The HKFS proposed asking five Legco members to resign in order to initiate the “Five-Districts Referendum.”
31 October 2014
The “Five-Party Platform” put into discussions whether the referendum was a proper way to determine the future orientation of the
UM.
3 November 2014 Joshua Wong wrote an article calling for the referendum.
6 November 2014
The Democratic Party and the Civic Party expressed concern about the potential costs and effectiveness of 
“Five-Districts Referendum.”
Source: Authors’ summary of news coverage in Apple Daily and Ming Pao.
attempted to create a Platform encompassing all major leaders. By employ-
ing Weberian charismatic (i.e., the purity of student leaders), functional, and
consensual approaches, they hoped to incorporate both political capital and
the perspectives of student organisations, CSOs, and pan-democratic parties
to legitimise their leadership. However, the internal structural constraints
of the HKFS and the distrustful relationships among the parties ultimately
made the Platform ineffective. Hence, the OCLP’s claim to legitimacy was
unsuccessful because its first legitimating mechanism failed to achieve both
functional and consensual requirements. 
With growing bottom-up pressure and increasingly ineffective functional
and consensual approaches, OCLP and the HKFS decided to pursue a more
radical strategy: the democratic approach of “on-site voting.” The two pur-
poses of this initiative were to ensure representativeness and to consolidate
the legitimacy of the UM’s leadership. Unfortunately, disagreements over
who counted as “the people” and the weighing of solidarity and legitimacy
ultimately nullified the effort. The failure to establish a direct democratic
mechanism caused rising indignation among radical protestors, who began
to target the movement’s two symbols of power: the picket team and the
“Big Stage.” Leaders were compelled to “democratise” these symbols in an
effort to alleviate the protesters’ anger and cloak the decision-making pro-
cess in a façade of inclusivity. However, the decision to open the “Big Stage”
backfired, as the stage was converted into an instrument for radical com-
munities to spread anti-leadership messages that further impaired their le-
gitimacy. The leadership’s final attempt to achieve legitimacy by forcing a
real referendum through the resignation of pan-democratic legislators also
failed because leaders were split into two sides with completely conflicting
visions concerning the objective of the referendum.
Over the course of the UM, attention shifted from the strike against the
government to internal conflicts between participants and leaders concern-
ing the issue of legitimacy. Bottom-up pressures not only compelled leaders
to adopt new strategies regarding the management and organisation of the
movement, but also exposed their differences, undercutting the very basis
of effective coordination. Although all three approaches (Weberian charis-
matic, functional, and consensual) were put into practice, the legitimacy
challenges never ended. The two failures to establish genuine democratic
approach (on-site and beyond-site voting) had fatal consequences for cross-
occupied site coordination and leader cooperation. The case of the UM
shows that sharing a commitment to the same injustices does not resolve
disagreements over strategies or direction. Furthermore, in an inclusive
large-scale movement, effective and legitimate leadership cannot be
grounded in non-democratic approaches. In sum, this analysis shows that
there is a need to seriously reflect on possible and feasible methods of
democracy in social movements.
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